Publications

In modern transportation networks, adversaries can manipulate routing algorithms using false data injection attacks, such as simulating heavy traffic with multiple devices running crowdsourced navigation applications, to mislead vehicles toward suboptimal routes and increase congestion. To address these threats, we formulate a strategically zero-sum game between an attacker, who injects such perturbations, and a defender, who detects anomalies based on the observed travel times of network edges. We propose a computational method based on multi-agent reinforcement learning to compute a Nash equilibrium of this game, providing an optimal detection strategy, which ensures that total travel time remains within a worst-case bound, even in the presence of an attack. We present an extensive experimental evaluation that demonstrates the robustness and practical benefits of our approach, providing a powerful framework to improve the resilience of transportation networks against false data injection. In particular, we show that our approach yields approximate equilibrium policies and significantly outperforms baselines for both the attacker and the defender.

This doctoral dissertation addresses the evolving challenges in computer and network security, emphasizing a need for a comprehensive framework that integrates proactive prevention, effective detection, and adaptive mitigation strategies across cyber-physical systems. The research introduces scalable multi-agent and deep reinforcement learning algorithms tailored to three key domains: (1) proactive prevention of threats using automated Moving Target Defense (MTD) configurations, (2) robust detection of stealthy False Data Injection (FDI) attacks in crowdsourced transportation networks using Policy Space Response Oracles, and (3) resilient real-time control policies for mitigating cyber-attacks on Industrial Control Systems (ICS).

The increasing reliance of drivers on navigation applications has made transportation networks more susceptible to data-manipulation attacks by malicious actors. Adversaries may exploit vulnerabilities in the data collection or processing of navigation services to inject false information, and to thus interfere with the drivers' route selection. Such attacks can significantly increase traffic congestions, resulting in substantial waste of time and resources, and may even disrupt essential services that rely on road networks. To assess the threat posed by such attacks, we introduce a computational framework to find worst-case data-injection attacks against transportation networks. First, we devise an adversarial model with a threat actor who can manipulate drivers by increasing the travel times that they perceive on certain roads. Then, we employ hierarchical multi-agent reinforcement learning to find an approximate optimal adversarial strategy for data manipulation. We demonstrate the applicability of our approach through simulating attacks on the Sioux Falls network topology.

Although researchers have characterized the bug-bounty ecosystem from the point of view of platforms and programs, minimal effort has been made to understand the perspectives of the main workers: bug hunters. To improve bug bounties, it is important to understand hunters’ motivating factors, challenges, and overall benefits. We address this research gap with three studies: identifying key factors through a free listing survey (n=56), rating each factor’s importance with a larger-scale factor-rating survey (n=159), and conducting semi-structured interviews to uncover details (n=24). Of 54 factors that bug hunters listed, we find that rewards and learning opportunities are the most important benefits. Further, we find scope to be the top differentiator between programs. Surprisingly, we find earning reputation to be one of the least important motivators for hunters. Of the challenges we identify, communication problems, such as unresponsiveness and disputes, are the most substantial. We present recommendations to make the bug-bounty ecosystem accommodating to more bug hunters and ultimately increase participation in an underutilized market.

While cloud computing is the current standard for outsourcing computation, it can be prohibitively expensive for cities and infrastructure operators to deploy services, especially for streaming applications. At the same time, there are underutilized computing resources within cities and local edgecomputing deployments. Using these slack resources may enable significantly lower pricing than comparable cloud computing; such resources would incur minimal marginal expenditure since their deployment and operation are mostly sunk costs. However, there are challenges associated with using these resources. First, they are not effectively aggregated or provisioned. Second, there is a lack of trust between customers and suppliers of computing resources, given that they are distinct stakeholders and behave according to their own interests. Third, delays in processing inputs may diminish the value of the streaming applications. To resolve these challenges, we introduce an architecture, combining a distributed trusted computing base, such as a blockchain, with an efficient messaging system like Apache Pulsar. Using this architecture, we design a decentralized computation market where customers and suppliers make offers to deploy and host streaming applications. The proposed architecture is independent of any particular blockchain implementation—as long as it supports smart contracts—and ensures that the market is robust to failures, while incurring the latency intrinsic in blockchain solutions only on deployment, rather than every output. We evaluate the market protocol using game-theoretic analysis to show that deviation from the protocol is discouraged. Finally, we evaluate the performance of a prototype implementation based on experiments with a streaming computer-vision application.

Power grids are evolving at an unprecedented pace due to the rapid growth of distributed energy resources (DER) in communities. These resources are very different from traditional power sources, as they are located closer to loads and thus can significantly reduce transmission losses and carbon emissions. However, their intermittent and variable nature often results in spikes in the overall demand on distribution system operators (DSO). To manage these challenges, there has been a surge of interest in building decentralized control schemes, where a pool of DERs combined with energy storage devices can exchange energy locally to smooth fluctuations in net demand. Building a decentralized market for transactive microgrids is challenging, because even though a decentralized system provides resilience, it also must satisfy requirements such as privacy, efficiency, safety, and security, which are often in conflict with each other. As such, existing implementations of decentralized markets often focus on resilience and safety but compromise on privacy. In this article, we describe our platform, called TRANSAX, which enables participants to trade in an energy futures market, which improves efficiency by finding feasible matches for energy trades, enabling DSOs to plan their energy needs better. TRANSAX provides privacy to participants by anonymizing their trading activity using a distributed mixing service, while also enforcing constraints that limit trading activity based on safety requirements, such as keeping planned energy flow below line capacity. We show that TRANSAX can satisfy the seemingly conflicting requirements of efficiency, safety, and privacy.

Moving target defense (MTD) is a proactive defense approach that aims to thwart attacks by continuously changing the attack surface of a system (e.g., changing host or network configurations), thereby increasing the adversary’s uncertainty and attack cost. To maximize the impact of MTD, a defender must strategically choose when and what changes to make, taking into account both the characteristics of its system as well as the adversary’s observed activities. Finding an optimal strategy for MTD presents a significant challenge, especially when facing a resourceful and determined adversary who may respond to the defender’s actions. In this paper, we propose a multi-agent partially-observable Markov Decision Process model of MTD and formulate a two-player general-sum game between the adversary and the defender. To solve this game, we propose a multi-agent reinforcement learning framework based on the double oracle algorithm. Finally, we provide experimental results to demonstrate the effectiveness of our framework in finding optimal policies.

In recent years, bug-bounty programs have garnered popularity and became a significant part of the security culture of many organizations. Bug-bounty programs enable these organizations to improve their security posture by harnessing the outside perspective of a diverse crowd of security experts (bug hunters). However, bug-bounty programs also suffer from inefficiencies, such as duplicate and invalid bug reports, which are resource consuming for organizations and bug hunters alike. To address these issues, it is crucial to understand how bug hunters make decisions, what motivates them, and what challenges they face. We present the results of an initial survey conducted among bug hunters to address these questions. We recruited 56 security experts who participate in bug-bounty programs to answer open-ended questions regarding various aspects of their participation in bug-bounty programs. Their responses provide a detailed overview of the motivations of security experts and the challenges that they face.

The emergence of blockchains and smart contracts has renewed interest in electrical cyberphysical systems, especially transactive energy systems. To address the associated challenges, we present TRANSAX, a blockchain-based transactive energy system that provides an efficient, safe, and privacy-preserving market built on smart contracts.

As the number of personal computing and IoT devices grows rapidly, so does the amount of computational power that is available at the edge. Many of these devices are often idle and constitute an untapped resource which could be used for outsourcing computation. Existing solutions for harnessing this power, such as volunteer computing (e.g., BOINC), are centralized platforms in which a single organization or company can control participation and pricing. By contrast, an open market of computational resources, where resource owners and resource users trade directly with each other, could lead to greater participation and more competitive pricing. To provide an open market, we introduce MODiCuM, a decentralized system for outsourcing computation. MODiCuM deters participants from misbehaving---which is a key problem in decentralized systems---by resolving disputes via dedicated mediators and by imposing enforceable fines. However, unlike other decentralized outsourcing solutions, MODiCuM minimizes computational overhead since it does not require global trust in mediation results. We provide analytical results proving that MODiCuM can deter misbehavior, and we evaluate the overhead of MODiCuM using experimental results based on an implementation of our platform.

Power grids are undergoing major changes due to the rapid adoption of intermittent renewable energy resources and the increased availability of energy storage devices. These trends drive smart-grid operators to envision a future where peer-to-peer energy trading occurs within microgrids, leading to the development of Transactive Energy Systems. Blockchains have garnered significant interest from both academia and industry for their potential application in decentralized TES, in large part due to their high level of resilience. In this paper, we introduce a novel class of attacks against blockchain based TES, which target the gateways that connect market participants to the system. We introduce a general model of blockchain based TES and study multiple threat models and attack strategies. We also demonstrate the impact of these attacks using a testbed based on GridLAB-D and a private Ethereum network. Finally, we study how to mitigate these attack.